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FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A policy holder of the defendant company brought a
derivative suit for an accounting in the Eastern District
Court of New York, where the policy holder resided. The
cause of action was based upon an alleged breach of trust
by the president of the defendant company. The action was
brought under a federal venue statute.' The three defendants
in the suit were the company which issued the policy, organ-
ized under Illinois law and authorized to transact business
in New York; the president of the company, an Illinois resi-
dent; and a second Illinois corporation acting as agent of
the company. The company's files and records were kept at
its principal place of business in Illinois. The District Court
granted defendant company's motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens.2 The Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed.3 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
affirmed; dismissal was within the discretion of the District
Court since inconvenience to the defendants of the suit in
New York greatly outweighed any convenience of the plain-
tiff policyholder. Koster v. (American) Lumbermem's Mutual
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).4
In a companion case decided by the Supreme Court on
the same day, a Virginia citizen brought an action in tort for
negligence in the Southern District Court of New York. The
action was brought under the same federal venue statute as
in the Koster case. The defendant was. a Pennsylvania cor-
poration authorized to transact business in Virginia and in
New York. An explosion occurred during defendant's de-
livery of gasoline to plaintiff's warehouse in Virginia, which
destroyed the warehouse and its contents. The District Court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens.5 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed.6 The Supreme Court reversed, citing
1. 36 Stat. 1101 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 11 (1940).
2. 64 F. Supp. 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
3. 153 F. 2d 888 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
4. Notes, 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 489 (1947), 47 Col. L. Rev. 853 (1947).
5. 62 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
6. 153 F. 2d 883 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
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the Koster case. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947).7
The principal cases present the problem of whether and
in what circumstances a federal district court may, in its dis-
cretion, refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in diversity cases
because the plaintiff has chosen an inconvenient forum. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens has for its purpose the pre-
vention of an arbitrary choice by a plaintiff of a forum in
which the defendant will encounter difficulties in his defense.
The Koster case also raised the problem of when a federal
district court should base its refusal to take jurisdiction upon
grounds that to do so would involve interference in the inter-
nal affairs of a foreign corporation. The "internal affairs
rule" should not be confused with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. The former can be stated thus: state and federal
courts may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, refuse to
entertain suits involving the internal ownership, i.e., the con-
flicting interests of stockholders, directors, and corporate of-
ficers, of a corporation domiciled in a foreign state.8 Neither
state nor federal courts have been able to formulate a precise
definition of cases which involve internal affairs9 But if,
in a given case, internal affairs of a foreign corporation are
involved, it by no means follows that a refusal by a court to
exercise its jurisdiction will at the same time achieve the ends
7. Notes, 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 489 (1947), 21 Tulane L. Rev. 669
(1947).
8. See Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law," 29 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1929); Foster, "Place of Trial-Inter-
state Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment," 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 41 (1930); Dainow, "The Inappropriate Forum," 29 Ill. L.
Rev. 867 (1934); Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum,"
60 Harv. L. Rev. 908 (1947). For excellent treatment of the de-
velopment of the internal affairs rule, see Notes, 33 Col. L. Rev.
492 (1933), 46 Col. L. Rev. 413 (1946).
9. The following are recent cases finding internal affairs involved:
Kelley v. American Sugar Refining Co., 139 F.2d 76 (C.C.A. 1st
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 791 (1944) (recovery of par value of
preferred stock and proportionate share of earned surplus); Over-
field v. Pennroad, 113 F.2d 6 (C.C.A. 3rd 1940) (accounting);
Grismer v. Merger Mines Corp., 43 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Wash. 1942)(cancellation of contract between corporation and director); Sharp
v. Big Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940)(levying assessments on stockholders); Wojtczak v. American Unit-
ed L. Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W. 364 (1940) (injunction
against performance of reinsurance contract); Miesse v. Seiberling
Rubber Co., 264 App. Div. 373, 35 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1942) (redemption
of preferred stock); Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co., 343 Pa.
438, 22 A. 2d 717 (1941) (cancellation of contract between cor-
poration and director).
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for which the doctrine of forum non conveniens was created.
A strict application of the "internal affairs rule" will often
defeat the very purpose of the doctrine of forum non conven-
lens, and will result in a refusal to try a case in the forum
actually most convenient to both parties. 10
In Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 1 the Supreme-Court
first adopted the "internal affairs rule" by following lower
federal court precedent. -12 Thirteen years later the case of
Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co.,23 while not expressly over-
ruling the Rogers case, substantially repudiated the "internal
affairs rule,' 14 and laid down a new test: that whether or not
a federal court is justified in refusing to exercise its diver-
sity jurisdiction in any case where a general venue statute
gives it jurisdiction, depends upon whether under the facts
of the case a trial in plaintiff's chosen forum will be "vexa-
tious and oppressive" to the defendant. Thus, the Supreme
Court in the Williams case put internal affairs cases essen-
tially on a forum non conveniens basis. On the other hand,
determination of the Congressional intent in the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act, a special venue statute,15 has resulted
in decisions that the right to bring actions thereunder is ab-
solute, not subject to defeat by a plea of forum non conven-
iens.16
The Circuit Court's dissenting opinions in the principal
cases were based primarily upon the fact that both were
brought under a general venue statute. 7 The basic argu-
10. Cf. Note, 33 Co L. Rev. 492, 502, n. 51 (1933).
11. 288 U.S. 123 (1933).
12. Wallace v. Motor Products Corp., 25 F.2d 655 (C.C.A. 6th 1928);
Eberhard v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 210 Fed. 520 (N.D.
Ohio 1914); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Newman, 187 Fed. 573
(C.C.A. 7th 1911); Cf. Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208
(1927).
13. 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
14. The Court in the Williams case disposed of the Rogers decision
with the comment that it was the only decision of the Supreme
Court holding that a federal court should decline to hear a case
because it concerned the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
15. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1940).
16. Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 155 P.2d 42 (Cal. 1944); Cf. Miles v.
Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942); Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941). See Loomis, "Interstate Commerce
In Damage Suits," 1 Wyo. L.J. 22 (1946), where the writer dis-
cusses abuses arising from the concentration of litigation under the
Federal Employers Liability Act in a few cities, notably Chicago,
Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City.
17. 36 Stat. 1101 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940).
[Vol 28
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ment of the dissents followed the reasoning of Meredith v.
Winter Haven18 which amounts to this: the jurisdiction given
by a general venue statute, as well as that given by a special
venue statute, is absolute and not subject to avoidance by a
plea of forum non conveniens.
The Supreme Court in the principal cases approved the
Williams case and followed its test of "vexatious and oppres-
sive." In the Koster case, the fact showing vexatiousness and
oppressiveness was the necessity for defendant company's
bringing its corporate records from Illinois to New York
for a trial. Mr. Justice Black, with Mr. Justice Rutledge,
dissented upon the ground that to make a stockholder tra-
verse the continent all but nullifies his inclination to sue. Mr.
Justice Reed, with Mr. Justice Burton, dissented upon the
ground that no sufficient showing had been made by the de-
fendant as to the relative convenience of the parties. In the
Gulf Oil Corp. case, the requisite vexatiousness and oppres-
siveness was supplied by the fact that all of the defendant's
witnesses resided in Virginia and would need to come to New
York for trial.19 The court rejected the plaintiff's only count-
er contention for convenience of the New York forum: that
Virginia juries were not accustomed to $400,000 law suits.
Mr. Justice Black, with Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissented upon
the ground that at least so far as law actions for recovery of
money damages 20 are concerned, a federal court should be
required to exercise its jurisdiction when properly invoked.
If the view of the dissenters had been accepted, the federal
courts would be required to wait for Congress to adopt the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Both the Koster and Gulf Oil Corp. cases held that the
New York and federal standards of forum non conveniens
were the same, and thus reserved decision on the question
whether Erie R.R. v. Tompkins21 requires a federal court in
18. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
19. But cf. Cox v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
where the court declined to grant defendant corporation's motion
to dismiss on grounds of forum non convenience and distinguished
the Gulf Oil Corp. case.
20. The cases in which the Supreme Court had previously upheld dis-
missals by lower federal courts upon grounds of forum non con-
veniens were suits in admiralty or in equity. Rogers v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
S. S. Co., 285 U.S. 413 (1931); Cf. Williams v. Green Bay & W.
R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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a diversity suit to follow the forum non conveniens policy of
the state in which the court is sitting. The purpose of the
Erie doctrine is to assure that state courts and federal courts'
sitting in the same state shall reach uniform results in di-
versity suits.22 In Weiss v. Routh2 the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit raised the question of its own
motion and held that the Erie doctrine required a federal
court in a diversity suit to apply the forum non conveniens
policy of the state in which it is sitting.24 In the Weiss case
Judge Learned Hand said that the purpose of the Egie doc-
trine "extends as much to determining whether the court
shall act at all, as to how it shall decide, if it does." In Grif-
fin v. McCoach,25 where a somewhat analogous problem was
raised, the Supreme Court held a federal district court bound
to follow a strong state policy of nonenforcement of rights
under certain foreign insurance contracts. There are at
least two reasons against the application of the Erie doctrine
to the forum non conveniens policy. First, the problem of
the expense of litigation to the state, being borne by the
state taxpayers, is a highly important reason for refusing
jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens where a di-
versity suit is brought in state courts. This is not involved
where the suit is brought in federal courts, since in the latter
cases the expenses of maintaining the court are borne by
the federal government. Second, a further reason frequent-
ly given by state courts for their dismissal on grounds of
forum non conveniens-that their dockets are crowded-may
not be a valid reason when given by federal courts. On the
22. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191 (1947): "The essence of diversity
jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State law and State
policy. If North Carolina has authoritatively announced that de-
ficiency judgments cannot be secured within its borders, it con-
tradicts the presuppositions of diversity jurisdiction for a federal
court in that State to give such a deficiency judgment."
23. 149 F.2d 193 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
24. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 883, 885 (C.C.A. 2d 1946),
where the court said that its pronouncement in the Weiss case
did not carry over to the facts of the Gulf Oil Corp. case. "It
is true that iij Weiss v. Routh . . . the court looked to New York
law for light as to the extent to which courts would interfere with
the internal management of a corporation. But that appears to us
much nearer substantive law-that of corporate supervision-than
is this question of the place of enforcement of a claim for money
damages."
25. 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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other hand, federal court dockets may be equally crowded.
It is submitted that, in the light of the Weiss and Griffin
cases, when the Supreme Court finally makes a decision on
the merits it will hold that the Erie doctrine is controlling.26
26. H. R. No. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1404(a) (1947), proposed but
not enacted by the recent Congress, is not enlightening upon the
Erie question. It provides "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought."
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